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The globalisation of Chinese capital 
Ilan Alon 
The globalisation of Chinese capital will be one of the hallmarks of 21st-century 
economics, shaping debates over state capitalism, ‘free’ markets and international 
institutions. China internationalised its product markets and upgraded its manufacturing 
prowess towards the end of the 20th century by allowing inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and by promoting export trade. This was supported in part by cheap 
labour, and resulted in growing trade surpluses with key trading partners—particularly 
the US. Outward FDI was discouraged in order to preserve foreign reserves, and 
together these policies have helped China accumulate significant amounts of capital, 
now making it a multi-trillion dollar reserve holder.  
During this period of increased inward foreign investment, Chinese companies were 
encouraged to establish joint ventures with multinationals and to absorb Western 
technology by working with Western firms. Multinationals, in turn, saw these joint 
ventures as an opportunity to enter the Chinese market, lower their manufacturing costs 
and outsource some of their production activity, focusing on ‘higher value-added’ 
activities. China quickly evolved into the manufacturing hub of the global economy, 
working across a wide variety of industrial sectors. Despite creating a niche as a world 
leader in original equipment manufacturing, Chinese companies are no longer satisfied 
with this position in the value-added chain. Profits reside with the design and brand 
owners, which are often Western multinational companies. So although China has 
received employment and investment benefits from Western investors, it has not reaped 
a proportionate share of the profits.  
Chinese companies are now armed with plentiful hard currency at a time when the 
global community is hungry for international capital. Cash-starved multinationals can 
sell their brands, channels of distribution, know-how and customer bases, thereby 
allowing Chinese multinationals to develop advanced capabilities in technology, design 
and branding. With this backdrop in mind, China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan has put a 
number of parameters in place to allow Chinese multinationals to gain global ground. 
This includes a number of plans to further economic reform and opening, to position 
Hong Kong for a leadership role in global finance, and to increase research and 
development spending as a percentage of total GDP. The plan also envisages that 
China will move up the value-added chain in strategic industrial clusters, modernise key 
industries and invest in infrastructure, all the while encouraging Chinese companies to 
‘go global’.  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are vital to China’s advancement in technology and 
globalisation and will play an important role in achieving these objectives. They are 
directed to seek out investments in natural resources to fuel economic growth, invest in 
new technologies and find international markets for Chinese goods. Chinese firms are 
not only market- and resource-seeking investors, like their Western counterparts, they 
are also interested in strategic assets and investments in know-how so as to move from 
manufacturing-led to knowledge-driven growth. And while the recent global economic 
environment has certainly facilitated China’s desire to ‘go global’, Beijing’s monetary 
policy—and its exchange rate policy in particular—has also affected China’s economic 
prospects.  
China’s currency, the renminbi, is increasingly involved in international settlements and 
contracts, and is already considered among the world’s most stable currencies. 
Demand for Chinese goods has facilitated support for its exchange rate, which is 
currently semi-fixed against the US dollar. If China’s fixed exchange rate regime were 
eliminated, the renminbi would likely appreciate anywhere from 20 per cent to 50 per 
cent, giving Chinese investors an immediate advantage in buying international assets. 
Although the peg is unlikely to be abandoned in the near future, international pressure 
on China to appreciate the renminbi will intensify, especially with imports worsening the 
balance-of-payments situation and harnessing GDP growth rates in many countries 
around the world. This means the renminbi is likely to appreciate against the dollar in 
the medium to long term, further fuelling outward investment when the change takes 
place.  
The rise of Chinese multinationals has inflamed global fears about China ‘taking over’ 
the world. It is true that Chinese companies with global ambitions are on an international 
buying spree and that international mergers and acquisitions are on the rise. But current 
concerns about China’s future world domination are exaggerated; Chinese outward 
investment as a percentage of overall GDP is much lower than that of most developed 
countries and its share of global outward FDI is less than 2 per cent.  
The great majority of Chinese international investment is carried out by state-owned 
companies, and their motivations can seem suspect to political figures in host countries. 
Consequently, Chinese companies effectively end up paying a premium over other 
bidders in order to offset this political uncertainty, which in turn serves to limit the 
economic benefits of any potential deal. In 2005, for example, Unocal accepted 
Chevron’s takeover bid instead of CNOOC’s offer because the premium offered by the 
Chinese SOE was too low to offset US congressional concern over the purchase. Given 
that much of Chinese outward FDI is state led, domestic as well as host government 
involvement will likely complicate international transactions and the perceived intentions 
of each side.  
A 2011 study gathered data from top executives of leading SOEs, representing 20 
diverse industries, to determine their motivations for investing overseas and to clarify 
the extent of this investment. The first primary push factor propelling the 
internationalisation of Chinese SOEs is the central government’s ‘go global’ policy and 
related incentives, while the second relates to the business strategies adopted by 
enterprise leaders. Most SOEs are pursuing business potential or access to natural 
resources, although about 20 per cent of the sample sought brands and technologies. 
The largest portion of China’s outward FDI goes to Asia (24 per cent) and most of this to 
Hong Kong. Africa and Europe both receive around 20 per cent, while investment in 
North America accounted for about 11 per cent. Subsidiary and representative offices 
were the most likely modes of entry into these host economies; Chinese SOEs seem to 
prefer investments in wholly owned or predominantly owned facilities, and most future 
investments are expected to focus on the expansion or upgrading of existing facilities 
(44 per cent) or new greenfield investments (38 per cent).  
Research on international mergers and acquisitions, meanwhile, is quite clear: most fail 
to create value for shareholders. Will the Chinese experience be different? Despite 
government support, Chinese companies are likely to suffer major losses from 
acquisitions abroad due to a lack of internal capability and resistance from foreign 
governments. Although Chinese companies have developed excellent manufacturing 
capabilities, their skills in technological development, marketing and branding, and 
international management remain weak. Many international managers do not speak 
English and have little experience in dealing with foreign regulations, cultures and 
business norms. Integrating the competencies of acquired companies requires a 
dynamic absorptive capacity that many Chinese firms lack. It is one thing to buy a 
company possessing certain technologies, but it is quite another to retain the talent 
required to further develop and apply these technologies after the acquisition.  
As Chinese SOEs and private companies increasingly ’go global’, questions will also 
arise about the practices of these firms both within China and abroad; the involvement 
of the Chinese government in the promotion of investment; and the contrasting political, 
economic and management systems—or ideologies—of each party. China’s pool of 
labour will likely become more expensive and the renminbi could well appreciate, 
meaning China will shift from export to foreign investment modalities of 
internationalisation. In the next decade, Chinese outward investment as a percentage of 
exports, GDP level and global outward FDI will also significantly expand, in turn raising 
questions about sovereignty, control of economic resources (particularly natural 
resources), reciprocal treatment and the application of international rules.  
Whether China will be able to continue developing its state sector abroad will largely 
depend on how these companies, and China more generally, are perceived by others in 
the future and how Chinese investors address these questions. Governance of SOEs 
based on Communist Party political leadership may embolden foreign leaders in 
democratic and free-market countries to reject acquisition attempts and to block full 
engagement. It is hoped that reactions to the ‘China threat’ or the ‘China challenge’ will 
be informed by data and logic rather than propaganda and perceptions. But it is not yet 
sure how China will react to the current debates over trade, investment and 
development, and whether Chinese management approaches, as well as its economic 
and trade policies, will spill over to other countries seeking to steer away from the 
Washington Consensus and from those management systems developed in the West 
over the last century. In any case, China is likely to dominate Asia’s economic 
landscape in the 21st century. Chinese historical and cultural ties to Asia, along with its 
physical proximity and economic attractions, will be key to elevating China’s regional 
power base in the years to come.  
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